Warning: The magic method Preloader_Plus\Preloader_Plus::__wakeup() must have public visibility in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/inc/preloader-plus.php on line 94 Warning: The magic method Preloader_Plus_Pro\Preloader_Plus_Pro::__wakeup() must have public visibility in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/preloader-plus-pro/inc/preloader-plus-pro.php on line 59 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/inc/preloader-plus.php:94) in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1768 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/inc/preloader-plus.php:94) in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1768 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/inc/preloader-plus.php:94) in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1768 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/inc/preloader-plus.php:94) in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1768 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/inc/preloader-plus.php:94) in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1768 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/inc/preloader-plus.php:94) in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1768 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/inc/preloader-plus.php:94) in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1768 Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/preloader-plus/inc/preloader-plus.php:94) in /customers/9/5/7/catherinebrown.org/httpd.www/wordpress/wp-includes/rest-api/class-wp-rest-server.php on line 1768 {"id":149,"date":"2014-03-27T12:12:15","date_gmt":"2014-03-27T12:12:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/catherinebrown.org\/wordpress\/?page_id=149"},"modified":"2023-02-02T21:44:52","modified_gmt":"2023-02-02T21:44:52","slug":"what-is-comparative-literature","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/catherinebrown.org\/what-is-comparative-literature\/","title":{"rendered":"What is ‘Comparative’ Literature?"},"content":{"rendered":"
This version is pre-editing; for the final version please see Comparative Critical Studies<\/em>, Volume 10, No. 1, 2013, 68-91.<\/p>\n WHAT IS \u2018COMPARATIVE\u2019 LITERATURE?[1]<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This \u00a0approaches the problems of self-definition surrounding \u2018comparative literature\u2019 by analysing the nature of comparison per se<\/em>, a the place of this practice in literary criticism past and present. It argues that comparison in its broadest sense is involved in all thought, but that comparison in the strictest sense is involved in only a minority of \u00a0criticism, whether described as comparative or otherwise. Certain works of literature call especially clearly for a comparative approach, through allusion to other works, or through establishing internally comparative structures (for example in parallel plots); such works might collectively be denoted by the noun phrase \u2018comparative literature\u2019. The nature of \u2018comparability\u2019 is analysed, and various factors affecting the results of comparison are noted in turn, \u00a0the topic on which the comparanda are compared, their number, and the degree of detail of their description. It is argued that literary criticism would benefit from greater self-consciousness with regard to comparison, and that departments of comparative literature would be well-placed to lead the process of theorising comparison, which hitherto has been remarkably overlooked.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Comparison per se<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n This \u00a0concerns a practice which is involved in all reading, yet has hardly ever been the explicit subject of literary theory. Comparison, in the broadest sense of term, is the mental process which enables us to perceive similarity and difference. Smells and ideas cannot be distinguished without perceiving their similarities and differences to others. Will cannot be exercised without comparing options; to choose <\/em>comes from gusto<\/em>, and involves, as Sainsbury\u2019s would have us do, tasting the difference<\/em>. A critic describes a literary work as mimetic <\/em>only after comparing it with both life and other works; it is only comparatively<\/em> mimetic. Matthew Arnold, who coined the term comparative literature <\/em>as a translation of compar\u00e9e<\/em>, claimed in his inaugural lecture at Oxford University in 1857 that \u2018No single event, no single literature is adequately comprehended except in relation to other events, to other literature\u2019.[2]<\/a> In our own century, Richard Rorty wrote: \u2018Good criticism is a matter of bouncing some of the books you have read off the rest of the books you have read\u2019.[3]<\/a>\u00a0 He might have added that good reading of criticism involves bouncing the criticism you are reading off the rest of the criticism which you have read. No text reads the same twice. A rereader always compares the text as read with their memory of that text as read in the past; this comparison runs synchronously with a comparison of what they have just read with what they anticipate is coming next.<\/p>\n Yet these functions of cognition are so ubiquitous that their designation as comparison<\/em> reduces the usefulness of the term. A narrower sense of the term is to denote the act or results of paying a similar quantity and quality of attention to a discrete number of in order to determine their similarities and differences with regard to possession, lack, or degree of possession of a particular quality. A minority of literary criticism practised today is of this kind – both of the inter-national, inter-linguistic, inter-artistic kind which presents itself as comparative literature<\/em>, and of the criticism which includes none of these divisions (hence Earl Miner\u2019s observation that \u2018it is difficult to discover actual comparison<\/em> in the world of the comparatists\u2019).[4]<\/a> A comparison of George Eliot with George Sand on the subject of (for example) literary realism may have the interest, but also the complication, of involving linguistic and cultural variables which are not directly related to A comparison of George Eliot with Elizabeth Gaskell on literary realism, which involves fewer circumstantial variables, may be more cleanly comparative, and in this sense more <\/em>comparative. Asymmetric comparison \u2013 paying a different quantity or quality of attention to two comparanda – has strong similarities with much criticism which is not usually considered comparative. For example, studying the influence of Miguel de Cervantes\u2019s El ingenioso hidalgo <\/em>don Quixote de la Mancha<\/em> on Nikos Kazantsakis\u2019s \u0392\u03af\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9 \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u0391\u03bb\u03ad\u03be\u03b7 \u0396\u03bf\u03c1\u03bc\u03c0\u03ac <\/em>[Life and Adventures of Alexis Zorbas<\/em>] has much in common with studying the representation of attitudes towards sex in rural 1930s Greece in the latter novel. In both cases one is looking for features of one complex object (a novel, and an aspect of a culture) in another; the discussion of any topic in literature involves a comparison of the form looking for X in Y<\/em>.<\/p>\n In the sixth yearbook of the British Comparative Literature Association\u2019s Comparative Criticism <\/em>Elinor Shaffer commented: \u2018Conducting a retrospective inquiry into specifically comparative modes of close analysis, we find that a very few comparative literary handbooks offered some direct discussion of comparative analysis of texts\u2019.[5]<\/a> The position of comparison as a topic in philosophy is also undeservedly obscure (when trying to find materials on comparison, Earl Miner too found that \u2018To my surprise, philosophers were equally dumb\u2019).[6]<\/a> No English-language reference work of philosophy of which I am aware has an entry for the term, despite the fact that comparison is as important a method to philosophy as to literary criticism, and that it is fraught with philosophical implications. (Resemblance<\/em> is<\/em> discussed in philosophy, but is a simpler concept than comparison <\/em>by virtue of lacking an epistemic agent). Therefore all literary criticism is comparative in a broad sense, whereas much criticism called comparative is not comparative in the strict sense of being conscious and methodical.<\/p>\n The academic subject comparative literature<\/em>, it is commented with a frequency which has tamed it into a reassuring truism, is anxiogenic.<\/em>[7]<\/a> This is partly because it is not easily defined either by method or <\/em>matter. In the 1970s Robert Clements commented that \u2018Comparative Literature sometimes figures in university curricula, but very few people know what they mean by the term\u2019, and the last two decennil reports of the American Comparative Literature Association defined themselves as concerned with the state (and therefore also the nature) of the discipline, rather than, as previously, on the standard of what was performed within it. In 2006 Robert Weninger claimed that \u2018nothing is written or published in comparative<\/em>\u2019, and pointed out that the Bernheimer report had dropped the proud initial capital letters from the discipline.[8]<\/a> (xii) Even this, it seemed, was too bold a move, and the Saussy report oscillated between comparative literature <\/em>and Comparative Literature<\/em>.<\/p>\n The problem of defining the subject by method is, as I have argued, that much of what is done under its remit is not methodically comparative. The bibliography of the British Comparative Literature Association\u2019s first (1979) Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature<\/em> contained sections for works concerning \u2018Literary Genres, Types and Forms\u2019, \u2018Bible, Classical Antiquity\u2019, \u2018Individual Countries\u2019, \u2018Individual Authors\u2019, and \u2018Comparative, World and General Literature\u2019. The three terms of the last category are often themselves imprecisely distinguished \u2013 just as \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043b\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430<\/em>, Allgemeiniteratur<\/em>, litt\u00e9rature g\u00e9n\u00e9rale<\/em>, and literatura universal <\/em>are from the equivalents of comparative literature <\/em>in their own languages.<\/p>\n The question then arises of whether comparative literature should simply be called, and become, the study of literature. Proponents of departments of literature include Ren\u00e9 Wellek and Austin Warren, who in 1949 argued against the idea of national literatures: \u2018There\u2019s just literature\u2019.[9]<\/a> Fourteen years later Wellek wished that \u2018we could simply speak of the study of literature […] and that there were, as Albert Thibaudet proposed, professors of literature just as there are professors of philosophy and of history\u2019.[10]<\/a> And in 2006 Jonathan Culler argued against Charles Bernheimer that: \u2018The turn to culture makes sense for national literature departments: the division of literature by national or linguistic boundaries was always rather dubious, but such divisions as these are a very reasonable way of organizing the study of culture\u2019; this would leave comparative literature with the distinctive role of studying literature: \u2018As the site of the study of literature in general, comparative literature would provide a home for poetics\u2019.[11]<\/a> Objections to such a plan come from those who consider that literature should always be related to culture in its broadest sense, and to other art forms. In 1972 Levin, and in 1995 Bernheimer, argued that comparative literature did not and should not concern literature alone. It is also objected that the general study of literature in practice rarely fulfils that remit, consisting largely in the study of European literature and its nearest relatives. Clearly, European literature<\/em>, not general<\/em>, world<\/em>, or comparative literature <\/em>should be the title of courses if that is what is studied; mwriting in response to that report urge: \u2018Study these interconnected European literatures, I say. They make sense together. They were made for each other\u2019.[12]<\/a><\/p>\n Both parts of the title comparative literature<\/em>, then, imperfectly denote the subject\u2019s de facto <\/em>remit. works of criticism which explicitly compare literary works to each other – for example George Steiner\u2019s Tolstoy or Dostoevsky: An Essay in Contrast <\/em>(1959), or Colin Burrow\u2019s Epic Romance: Homer to Milton <\/em>(1993). The first is a cleanly bilateral comparison; the second traces the treatments of a common mode (epic romance) in a series of works across time, and in so doing compares those works as participants in a tradition. Criticism which, as Peter Brooks claimed of himself as a graduate student, is not \u2018comparing <\/em>literature, just working in more than one\u2019be described (if any such description is necessary) as supra-national or supra-linguistic criticism \u2013 for example, Erich Auerbach\u2019s Mimesis: Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendl\u00e4ndischen Literatur<\/em> (1946).[13]<\/a> This work explores modes of mimesis in a large number of texts, but unlike Epic Romance: Homer to Milton <\/em>its overwhelming concern is with its central topic, not with bringing its examples into mutual relation. In addition, criticism which brings literature into relationship with any other art form \u2013 for example Diane Gillespie\u2019s The Sisters\u2019 Arts: The Writing and Painting of Virginia Woolf and Vanessa Bell <\/em>(1988) \u2013 should be classified as inter-artistic criticism rather than as comparative literature, even if (as is often the case with such projects) the institutional home of the work is a department of literature. , the anxiety surrounding the phrase comparative literature <\/em>would be much diminished. Departments currently named comparative literature<\/em> could be renamed as departments of inter-national literature<\/em>, general literature<\/em>, or literature<\/em>.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Making Comparisons <\/strong><\/p>\n I have already tried to define comparison<\/em> as a , but a comparison <\/em>is both an action and its outcome – making a comparison<\/em> can refer both to the process of comparing and to the description of this process and its result (one cannot be described without the other). For example, were someone to say that a historian compares Hitler and Stalin, she might mean that the historian tries to discover the similarities and differences of these men, or that he draws attention to such similarities and differences as he has found them to possess. This is an important ambiguity \u2013 between the performance and results of comparison, between the discovery of results and their dissemination, and therefore between empiricism and rhetoric.<\/p>\n Language is not necessary to the performance of comparison, but it is to its description, in which it can prove limited. In English the language of comparison tends to imply one of three positions, which may be approximated to similarity, difference, and neutrality. One compares something and<\/em>, with<\/em> or to<\/em> something else; and <\/em>is neutral, with <\/em>suggests the expectation of similarity, and to <\/em>suggests the expectation of difference. Something is the same as <\/em>something, but different to<\/em>, from<\/em>, or than <\/em>it.<\/em> Apart from the fact that to<\/em> is more common in British English, and from<\/em>and than<\/em>, in North American English, to<\/em> implies orientation towards the differing other, from <\/em>implies departure from it, and than <\/em>implies an alternative to and possible displacement of it. The comparer should compare and choose her words with care. One likens to<\/em> and contrasts with<\/em>, but these collocative prepositions are perverse, and would in theory function better with the reverse verbs, liken with <\/em>and contrast to<\/em>. This would leave and<\/em> as a neutral conjunction best befitting compare<\/em>, as in \u2018I intend to compare [contemporary Russian playwright] Vassily Sigarev and Martin McDonagh\u2019.<\/p>\n In contrast to to contrast <\/em>(contra-stare<\/em>, to stand against), to compare <\/em>also means to regard or represent as analogous or similar, and, intransitively, to be of the same or similar quality or value – as in \u2018Ibsen compares with Lorca as a tragedian\u2019\u00a0\u2013 hence examination questions beginning \u2018compare and [by contrast] contrast\u2019. H.M. Posnett, one of the first Anglophone theorists of comparative literature, in the 1880s implied identity by comparison <\/em>when he asserted that \u2018The most colourless proposition of the logician is either the assertion of a comparison, A is B, or the denial of a comparison, A is not B\u2019.[14]<\/a>,\u00a0 compare<\/em> is an analogy, equal, or rival of something else. Many terms for comparison stress likeness over difference: to com<\/em>–pare <\/em>is to bring together parities, vergleichen <\/em>makes gleich<\/em> [the same], \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0442\u044c\u00b4 <\/em>makes \u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0439<\/em> [equal], and a \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 <\/em>is a simile as well as a comparison. The ancient Greek \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae<\/em> [from \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1 <\/em>plus \u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae<\/em>, a casting, throwing, or putting] is a placing side by side, or an analogy. In a parable, as in an allegory, something is made to stand for something else on the basis of similarity or translation; \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae<\/em> was borrowed in the Latin parabola<\/em>, or comparison, and in post-classical Latin it is an allegory, proverb, discourse, or speech \u2013 an expansion of meaning which acknowledges the importance of comparison to rhetoric. The Latin comparare <\/em>also meant to place together, couple, unite, pit against, treat as equal. By contrast, the modern Greek term for comparison, \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03c9<\/em> [to judge together] avoids the prejudgement of results which pertain to both compare<\/em> and contrast<\/em>. Whereas the Latin instruction cp.<\/em> in practice often invites contrast, cf. <\/em>invites open-minded comparison.<\/p>\n Of course, no two things (in sofar as absolutely discreet objects can even be conceived) are identical or absolutely different; they attract comparative investigation because they are felt to be a metaphor <\/em>in Todorov\u2019s sense – constituted by the tension of difference and resemblance, separateness and communication.[15]<\/a> That is, an initial comparison will have suggested either that the comparanda <\/em>are different <\/em>(an adjective used rhetorically to indicate that they are more different than might be expected) or, more often, that they are similar <\/em>(that is, more similar than might be expected). A critic might decide to pursue a comparison of Pride and Prejudice<\/em> and Mansfield Park<\/em> in order to try to explain the striking differences of these nearly contemporaneous works by the same author; or might decide to compare Charles Dickens and Franz Kafka (as did Mark Spilka in 1963), having discerned that they share profound similarities as well as obvious differences. The idea of an initial comparison preceding further comparison indicates another ambiguity in the word, which can refer not just to a methodical process, but to the unexamined impression which prompts it.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n When comparing literary works originating in different places, differences between them are the assumed basis, and one of the ends, of the investigation: the background of divergence against which the similarities which suggested the comparison appear, and the finer points which appear against those similarities. Earl Miner notes that \u2018Comparison is feasible when presumptively or formally identical topics, conditions, or elements are identified. Of course what is presumptively but not actually identical soon betrays difference. With tact and luck, however, we may find the difference just great enough to provide interest, and the presumed identity strong enough to keep the comparison just.\u2019[17]<\/a> For example, Mark Spilka acknowledges that Dickens and Kafka might appear to be antitheses, as respectively English Gentile, Victorian, comic, extrovert, and moralistic – and German-Czech Jewish, twentiethcentury, pessimistic, introverted, and neurotic. Against these differences Spilka places what he discerns to be the two authors\u2019 elective and accidental affinities \u2013 obsessions with familial exclusions, the bestiality in humanity, infantile perspectives, and the grotesque. In describing examples of these in each he continues to acknowledge their differences (for example Dickens\u2019s greater habitual warmth), but is placing these differences in the new perspective of their similarities. Rather than being simply very different<\/em> authors, Spilka makes them metaphors<\/em> (in Todorov\u2019s sense) for each other.<\/p>\n Description of difference in relation to an other is one aim of comparison, but description of difference in relation to the self is not. The very impulse to compare complex objects produces the attendant impulse to stabilize at least one of the comparanda<\/em> rather than pay attention to the instabilities of all simultaneously; to limit the length of investigation of each literary work, for example, in order to maintain contact between them, and to limit the potentially-infinite discovery of difference in thick description – and, therefore, of non-comparability. Of course, a similar problem presents itself in relation to any literary analysis; the logical end point of concern for accuracy of description is simply to quote a text in its entirety. However, in comparative analysis the factor which limits accuracy of detail is not just the need to make one\u2019s analysis finite, but to hold the comparanda<\/em> in palpable mutual relationship. Clearly, Mark Spilka found that there were features of Kafka\u2019s writings which could only or best be described as Dickensian, and of Dickens\u2019s which could only or best be described as Kafkaesque \u2013 but this does not mean that he necessarily felt that he was giving an adequate description of either author or any one of their texts, taken alone.<\/p>\n In addition, the arts, unlike the sciences, are infrequently able to use quantitative units in comparison (although they might do so more often than they do), but rely on a crude vocabulary of identity, opposition, equilibrium, and comparatives, modified by intensifiers and qualifiers. Most comparative cadences in literary study assert either identity or difference: \u2018Both \u0412\u043e\u0439\u043d\u0430 \u0438 \u041c\u0438\u0440 <\/em>[War and <\/em>Peace] and \u0410\u043d\u043d\u0430 \u041a\u0430\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0430 <\/em>[Anna Karenina<\/em>] treat the Russian peasantry as a repository of value\u2019; \u2018In contrast to War and Peace<\/em>, Anna Karenina<\/em> presents itself as a novel in the European mode\u2019. The vague term relatively <\/em>is used to indicate a relatively small degree of difference. The phrases just as<\/em> and (more conscientiously) rather <\/em>cover a range of degrees and types of similarity; whereas<\/em> covers a range of differences; the present assertions are no more precise than what they describe. Or little more. Or hardly more. Yet in explicitly comparative work the degree of descriptive detail attained is crucial, since it determines what is described as a similarity and what as a difference. In practice the transition from the first to the second often involves a slight increase in detail. \u2018Both \u0412\u043e\u0439\u043d\u0430 <\/em>\u0438 <\/em>\u041c\u0438\u0440 <\/em>[War and <\/em>Peace] and \u0410\u043d\u043d\u0430 <\/em>\u041a\u0430\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0430 <\/em>[Anna Karenina<\/em>] treat the Russian peasantry as a repository of value\u2019 – but \u2018Whereas War and Peace<\/em> actually presents admirable peasants, in Anna Karenina<\/em> the idea of the Russian peasantry as a repository of value exists largely in Levin\u2019s mind, and even that only once he has had the epiphany which concludes the novel\u2019.<\/p>\n It is salutary to be reminded of the flexibility of such terms as similarity <\/em>and difference<\/em>, which are such heavily-used tools of thought, and are supposed antonyms; similarity is merely difference on a relatively small scale. A bespoke tailor will not make a pair of trousers exactly symmetrical; asymmetry is the product of attention to detail. Moreover, the choice of describing a relationship as a similarity or a difference\u00a0can be determined in the interests of rhetoric. Indeed, comparisons have long been associated with not only rhetoric but odiousness: \u2018Odyous of olde been comparisonis, And of comparisonis engendyrd is haterede\u2019. (Lydgate, 1430) In Shakespeare\u2019s works comparison is repeatedly characterised as quibbling, equivocation, jibing allusion and scoffing analogy. Rosaline in Love\u2019s Labour\u2019s Lost<\/em> disparages Berowne as renowned as \u2018a man replete with mocks;\/ Full of comparisons and wounding flouts\u2019; Beatrice predicts that Benedick will \u2018but break a comparison or two on me; which,\/ peradventure not marked or not laughed at, strikes him into melancholy\u2019; Falstaff complains of Hal as \u2018the most comparative, rascalliest, sweet young Prince\u2019. (Love\u2019s Labour\u2019s Lost<\/em> 5.2.30-31; Much Ado About Nothing<\/em> 2.1.136-68; Henry IV Part 1<\/em> 1.2.80-81).<\/p>\n But \u2013 if it is done conscientiously – one condition of a methodical comparison being considered worthy of pursuit is that the entities concerned are in fact comparable<\/em>. Comparability involves a degree of similarity in the comparanda<\/em>. Of course, any thing can be compared with anything else, and comparable<\/em> resembles similar<\/em> and different<\/em>in being a relative, not an absolute, term, the applicability of which rests on a comparison. The same is true of non- <\/em>and in- comparable<\/em>. Charges of non-comparability rhetorically assert that vacuity, tactlessness, unfairness, or some other wrong would be involved in pursuing a comparison. These are statements of value. The assertion that any one thing, rather than an assembly of things, is incomparable<\/em>, or beyond compare<\/em>, implies that the qualities which it has in common with the other things most like it are trivial in comparison to its distinguishing characteristic\/s, and that the pursuance of comparison would involve paying insufficient attention to those characteristics, thus rendering the comparison either trivial or invalid. The assertion \u2018you can\u2019t compare J.K. Rowling to C.S. Lewis\u2019 implicitly argues that their similarities of subject matter are unimportant compared to their differences of accomplishment, and that to describe either would be at best uninteresting and at worst insulting to Lewis. Similarly, Orsino tells Viola in Twelfth Night<\/em>: \u2018Make no compare\/ Between that love a woman can bear me\/ And that I owe Olivia\u2019. (Twelfth Night<\/em>: 2.4.100) Sometimes people describe a work of art as incomparable<\/em> not only in order to express admiration for it, but also to imply that it is in the nature of the work\u2019s excellence to determine a mode in which it alone should be explored, and which is always by far the most valuable mode in which to explore it. The phrase \u2018that incomparable work of literature, Dante\u2019s Divina Commedia<\/em>\u2019 asserts that the work is superlatively good, but also implies that it must be understood on its own terms. This is also what is meant by claims of uniqueness (since everything is unique as well as comparable, it too is a relative descriptor). The most extreme version of this argument is that the work\u2019s own terms are the only <\/em>ones on which it can be understood. The implication (rarely embraced) is that the work uses a private language in Wittgenstein\u2019s sense, and is therefore incomprehensible. Comparatists assert both comparability and comprehensibility. Peter Szondi asserted that \u2018Kein Kunstwerk behauptet da\u00df es unvergleichbar ist (das behauptet allenfalls der K\u00fcnstler oder de Kritiker), wohl aber verlangt es, da\u00df es nicht verglichen werde\u2019 [No work of art declares that it is incomparable (at most it is the artist or critic who claims that), but every work of art demands that it not be compared][18]<\/a>. But this is clearly wrong- certain works do clearly ask to be compared with others: James Joyce\u2019s Ulysses <\/em>and Derek Walcott\u2019s Omeros <\/em>to the \u1f48\u03b4\u03cd\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 <\/em>[Odyssey<\/em>] of Homer for example. One entity of which incomprehensibility as well as incomparability is sometimes asserted is God \u2013 a claim made by several kinds of theism. The same compound assertion is made in order to express or advocate a sense of quasi-religious awe in relation to non-divine subjects – for example, since the later 1960s, to the Holocaust. A bill proposed to the Israeli Parliament in January 2012 would have outlawed comparisons to the Nazis.[19]<\/a><\/p>\n Assertions of non-comparability as applied to combinations of objects are often based on a sense that the way in which they are most likely to be compared will not generate valid<\/em> results. Neither apples nor oranges are proverbially asserted to be intrinsically incomparable, but they are asserted to be mutually non-comparable – presumably because their similarities of size and use generate the risk that they will be judged according to the same criteria, and an orange would be unfairly criticized as less crisp than an apple (in this sense the idiom may be contrasted with chalk and cheese \u2013 <\/em>more of a contrast). Hazlitt stated that \u2018Comparisons are […] impertinent, and lead only to the discovery of defects by making one thing the standard of another which has no relation to it\u2019.[20]<\/a> Similarities should therefore not be allowed to obscure differences which affect comparability; this is perhaps the sense behind the perfect rhyme in the roughly-equivalent Serbian phrase \u043f<\/em>\u043e\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0438 \u0431\u0430\u0431\u0435 \u0438 \u0436\u0430\u0431\u0435<\/em> [to compare grandmothers and toads]. A critic might for example assert that Madame Bovary<\/em> and Effi Briest <\/em>are not properly comparable as novels of adultery, because of the differences of time and place of their production.<\/p>\n The charge of incommensurability denies that a certain type of measure can be applied to all of the proposed comparanda<\/em>. For example, Spanish has an idiom which disparages sumar peras con manzanas<\/em> [adding pears and apples].[21]<\/a> It is certainly possible to count pieces of fruit<\/em>, but the specific category of pear-or-apple <\/em>is, the idiom implies, of little interest. The Russian<\/a> idiom \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0442\u0451\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0435 \u0441 \u043c\u044f\u0433\u043a\u0438\u043c<\/em> prohibits the comparison of the warm with the soft, since no single measure can be made of warmth and softness. Finally, certain qualities are differently perceived by different people. The Hungarian idiom \u00edzl\u00e9sek \u00e9s pofonok <\/em>[tastes and smacks] suggests that the relative value of different objects cannot be absolutely decided if they are judged on qualities which are differently perceived by individuals, rather as two smacks in the face cannot be compared if they are received by different people. It is also the case that any <\/em>comparison must be performed by one person. Certainly, non-subjective qualities can be determined as belonging to different objects by different people, as Franco Morretti argues. [22]<\/a> The objects can be compared by a third person making use of their descriptions. Most comparative literary criticism \u2013 like any other kind – is done under the influence of others\u2019 criticism of the works concerned. But for a comparison per se <\/em>to take place, the comparanda<\/em>must be apprehended by one mind. Relative unity of physical or conceptual place assists the equally-important unity of time. It helps to place the texts which a critic wishes to compare literally side by side. The end result of comparison is generated in an instant in which the qualities of the comparanda <\/em>\u2013 a similar kind of grotesque in the works of Dickens and Kafka, for example – are simultaneously present to the comparer\u2019s mind.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Comparison in Comparative Literature<\/strong><\/p>\n I have suggested that today comparison is a minority pursuit. But i has played a central part in the development of criticism as a subject \u2013 notably, in a European context, in comparisons of the Greeks to the Romans, and the Ancients to the moderns (even today, as Earl Miner notes, \u2018It is left to students of the Renaissance, the Middle Ages, and antiquity to do pretty much what the comparatists are thought to do, only under other names.\u2019)[23]<\/a> Comparison and criticism were connected more systematically in the later nineteenth century, when literary studies were modelled on the evolving scientific disciplines: Literaturwissenschaft<\/em>, on Naturwissenschaft<\/em>. Specifically, comparative literature was modelled on other subjects with comparative <\/em>in their titles, including philology, biology, and philosophy. Science, in part, proceeds inductively through comparison; experiments analyse a comparandum<\/em> in relation to an isolated variable, and observe deviations from the secundum comparatum<\/em> or control<\/em>. Comparative philology operated by observing similarities in languages which had hitherto been assumed to be unconnected, and then by both using historical information to explain the connection, and by inducing historical hypotheses from the connection.<\/p>\n The results of such comparisons were sometimes explained, in the dimension of time, with the use of a tree metaphor. Indeed, tree-shaped comparativism has shown considerable durability in literary study, where it has tended either to point to similar social conditions generating similar literary phenomena (such as the rise of the novel in industrialising countries), or to posit direct influence between phenomena (such as naturalism as a development or offshoot<\/em> of realism). Posnett tended to the first type of analysis in his comparisons of clan, town, national, and world literature. More recently, Franco Moretti described the history of British nineteenthcentury detective fiction in evolutionary terms, showing the results of his symmetric comparisons of novels in tree diagrams which showed the divergence and convergence over time of what he denoted as different genres.[24]<\/a><\/p>\n The study of influence, which has proved a stronger and more enduring vein of criticism than social comparison, is necessarily asymmetric. Aleksei Veselovskii, brother of Aleksandr and co-founder of the Department of World Literature at Moscow University with Nikolai Storozhenko in 1873, stated at the beginning of his 1881 The Western Influence in New Russian Literature<\/em> that \u2018he exchange of ideas, images, fables, artistic forms between the tribes and peoples of the civilized world is one of the most important things studied by the still-young science of literary history\u2019.[25]<\/a> In 1961 Henry Remak criticized French criticism for its emphasis on influence studies rather than comparison in the strictest sense, arguing that \u2018Purely <\/em>comparative subjects constitute an inexhaustible reservoir hardly tapped by contemporary scholars who seem to have forgotten that the name of our discipline is \u201ccomparative literature\u201d not \u201cinfluential literature\u201d\u2019.[26]<\/a> Similarly, in 1992 Peter V. Zima, who used the terms \u2018der genetischer Vergleich\u2019 for contact studies and \u2018der typologischer Vergleich\u2019 for the study of at \u2018\u00c4hnlichkeiten\u2019 [similarities] which are produced, without contact, on the grounds of similar conditions of production or reception\u2019, argued that \u2018Die Erfahrungen der Sozialwissenschaften zeigen indessen, dass nicht die genetischen, sondern gerade die typologischen Beziehungen als Grundlage der Komparistik werden sollten\u2019 [the experiences of the social sciences indicate that not genetic, but precisely typological relationships, should become the basis of comparativism].[27]<\/a> In the following year Claudio Guill\u00e9n distinguished three supranational bases for literary comparison: influence, socio-historic conditions, and critical methodology. Yet in practice, these bases are not easily separable. Zima had argued that \u2018Kontakt und Analogiestudie einander erg\u00e4nzen und in vielen F\u00e4llen nich unabh\u00e4ngig voneinander durchgef\u00fchrt werden k\u00f6nnen\u2019 [\u2018contact studies and analogy studies comple each other, and in many cases can\u2019t be pursued in mutual independence\u2019].[28]<\/a> Furthermore,some critical methodology is necessary to the observation of those similarities and differences which may then be explained in terms of socio-historic conditions or influence; in this sense, Guill\u00e9n\u2019s third basis is the only \u2018basis\u2019, and the other two are contexts used to explain the results found thereon. For example, Moretti classified and compared detective novels according to the kinds of clues which they gave to the reader, and explained the survival and extinction of genres in terms of the literary marketplace.[29]<\/a> On the other hand, critical methodology can be viewed as culturally specific as the literature of which it purports to provide the basis of comparison. In 1992 Earl Miner argued that every culture bases its poetics on the basis of the most dominant genre at the time (in the West, drama; in the rest of the world, lyric), and that these theories, brought into inter-relation, should constitute the basis of intercultural poetics.[30]<\/a><\/p>\n Most comparativism is not so rigorously theorised, however. In 2006 Jonathan Culler argued that \u2018World literature courses that bring together the great books from around the world seem to base comparability on a notion of excellence, so that comparison \u2013 the principle of comparability \u2013 rather than opening new possibilities for cultural value, more often than not restricts and totalizes it\u2019.[31]<\/a> However, courses of world and general literature do not necessarily assert the comparability<\/em> of the works of literature they select, any more than they demand their comparison; indeed, they may purport to make their selection on the criterion of incomparability. When comparison is required, it will not be the comparison of excellence (the excellence of a work of literature being connected to its uniqueness), but will have reference to \u2018specific intellectual norms or models \u2013 generic, thematic, historical\u2019 which, Culler himself argues, \u2018are subject to investigation and argument in ways that the vacuous bureaucratic norms are not\u2019.[32]<\/a><\/p>\n In the phrase comparative literature<\/em>, comparative <\/em>is the attribute of literature<\/em>. Yet it is almost never understood in this way, the semantic meaning having drifted apart from the compositional meaning. The same is true of vergleichende Literatur <\/em>and \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f<\/em> \u043b\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430<\/em>, although not of compar\u00e9e<\/em>, in which the literature is the passive object of comparison. Clements noted that the equivalent<\/p>\n \u2018East Asian terms are a compound essentially of two substantives. The Chinese pi-chiao w\u00ean-hs\u00fceh<\/em>, the Japanese hikaku bungaku<\/em>, and the Korean pigyo munhak<\/em> consist of \u201ccomparison\u201d plus \u201cliterature\u201d. The terms thus denote […] the scientific comparison of two or more literatures without inclusion of adjectival modifiers. Perhaps if we followed suit and adopted the simple \u201cliterature comparison\u201d we might eliminate a great deal of discussion\u2019.[33]<\/a> On the other hand, Wellek considered that \u2018There is little use in deploring the grammar of the term and to insist that it should be called \u201cthe comparative study of literature\u201d, since everybody understands the elliptic usage\u2019.[34]<\/a><\/p>\n Yet the phrase comparative literature <\/em>could be seen to point to a meaning which does correspond with its compositional sense: literature which invites the performance of internal comparison, or which, to put it another way, comparisons<\/em>. This is to use the noun